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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----0000000-----
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Appellant - Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Respondent - Defendant. 
-----0000000-----
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-----0000000-----
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff - appellant, National 
Fanners Union Property and Casualty Company, against the de~endant -
respondent, Western Casualty and Surety Company, under a theory of 
equitable and conventional subrogation and/or contribution, to recover 
proportionate share of monies paid in settlement of a tort claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
There being no real dispute as to the facts of this case, 
both parties made Motions for Summary Judgment and filed Memoran-
dnms uf Points and Authorities with respect thereto. Both Motions were 
:,- '''
1 by Judge Dean E. Conder on the 9th day of June, 1977. Based 
_ 1 -
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upon the written and oral arguments, the Court ordered that appellant! 
Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and that respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment be granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Order granting respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment set aside and further seeks a Judgment in its favo: 
and against the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant issued a General Liability-Automobile Policy 
No. E42-6016A to Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse providing fo1 
bodily injury limits of $50, 000. 00 per person and $100, 000. 00 per 
occurrence subject to the applicable limit per person and that said 
policy was in force and effect on June 15, 1972. 
Respondent issued a Homeowners Policy No. CH 94 70 59 
to Brent G. Story & Ila S. Story providing for bodily injury and ~iabilil! 
cove~age of $25, 000. 00 per occurrence and medical payments to other: 
of $500. 00 per person and said policy of insurance was in force and 
effect on June 15, 1972. 
At all times material herein, Brent G. Story was the 
Captain of the Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse and in that 
capacity had the right to control and did in fact control the members 
of said Posse and had overall general supervision of the conduct oft\' 
members of the Posse at all practice drills and parades and olliec 
-2- • 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
performances. 
On June 15, 1972, the Weber County Sheriff's Mounted 
Posse was conducting a practice drill on its grounds near Harrisville, 
Weber County, State of Utah. At that time, Brent G. Story was 
present and functioning in his capacity as Captain of the Weber County 
Sheriff's Mounted Posse. Some of the Posse members had completed 
the drill, but others were still in the process of drilling at 9:30 P. M. 
when one of the horses owned by Afton LeRoy Cheney escaped from 
the grounds, ran through an open gate on to the highway and was there 
struck by a motor vehicle in which Arthur E. Haggen, Jr. was riding 
as a passenger, 
As a result of that collision, Arthur E. Haggen, Jr, was 
permanently paralyzed from the neck down. Arthur E. Haggen, Jr. 
filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Weber County naming, among 
others, as defendants Afton LeRoy Cheney, Brent G. Story and the 
Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse. The case was settled for the 
sum 'of $50, 000. 00. 
Based upon the amount prayed for by Arthur E. Haggen, Jr, 
in his Complaint, and the insurance policy limits of the Weber County 
Sheriff's Mounted Posse, Afton LeRoy Cheney and Brent G. Story, the 
Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse was to pay fifty percent (50%) 
of the settlement or $25, 000, 00, Afton LeRoy Cheney was to pay twenty-
fivc percent (25%) of the settlement or $12, 500. 00 and Brent G, Story 
'
1
' ui pay twenty-five percent (25o/o) of the settlement or $12, 500, 00. 
-3-
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Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellant, the 
insurance carrier for the ·weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse, 
paid Arthur E. Haggen, Jr. $50, 000. 00. Subsequently, appellant has 
recovered $12, 500. 00 from the insurance carrier of Afton LeRoy Che: 
representing his pro rata share. However, the respondent, the insura· 
carrier of Brent G. Story, has not, as yet, paid its proportionate sha: 
to the appellant. 
Coverage under either insurance policy is not in dispute. 
The question is one of determining the relative liability of two insuram 
companies providing concurrent coverage for the same loss, The 
"pro rata liability" provision of Brent G. Story's insurance policy with 
respondent reads: 
This Company shall not be liable for a greater 
proportion of any loss than the amount hereby 
insured shall bear to the whole insurance cover-
ing the property against the peril involved, 
whether collectible or not. 
The "other insurance" provision of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted 
Poss'e•s insurance policy with appellant reads: 
The insurance afforded by this policy is primary 
insurance, except when stated to apply in excess 
of or contingent upon the absence of other 
insurance. vVhen this insurance is primary and 
the insured has other insurance which is stated 
to be applicable to the loss on an excess or con-
tingent basis, the amount of the company's 
liability under this policy shall not be reduced 
by the existence of such other insurance. 
When both this insurance and other insuran~ 
apply to the loss on the same basis, whe~ 
mary, excess or contingent, the compan_y !J1Jll 
-4-
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not be liable under this policy for a greater 
proportion of the loss than that stated in the 
applicable contribution provision below: 
(b) Contribution by Limits. If any of such 
other insurance does not provide for contribution 
by equal shares, the company shall not be liable 
for a greater proportion of such loss than the 
applicable limit of liability under this policy for 
!;!uch loss bears to the total applicable limit of 
liability of all valid and collectible insurance 
against such loss. [Emphasis added.] 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
WHERE THERE IS CONCURRENT INSURANCE 
COVERAGE AND THE "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE 
OF ONE LIABILITY POLICY CONFLICTS WITH A 
SIMILAR CLAUSE OF THE OTHER LIABILITY POLICY, 
REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAUSE, 
THE CLAUSES ARE MUTUALLY REPUGNANT 
AND THE INSURERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO 
SHARE THE LOSS IN PROPORTION TO THE 
LIMITS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POLICIES, 
Generally "other insurance" clauses take one of the follow-
ing three forms: (1) Pro rata clauses which provide that the insurer 
will be liable only for a pro rata share of the loss, usually in proportion 
to the limits of liability of its policy in relation to the limits of liability 
of all other valid and collectible insurance;l (2) excess clauses which 
1. See: Lamb- Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 
! 10, 118, 341 P. Zd 110, 114 (1959): 
II the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this 
\'ulu: 1 the Company shall not be liable under this policy for a 
!l _,,ter proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of lia-
'" ... bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and 
-
01 lc:c tible insurance. . . . 
- 5-
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provide that the insurer will be liable for any loss which exceeds the 
limits of liability of all other valid and collectible insurance;Z and (lJ 
escape clauses which provide that the policy affords no coverage if 
other insurance is available. 3 In addition, some policies contain co11. 
binations of the above types: to wit, (1) escape-excess which provide; 
that if other valid and collectible insurance covering a specific loss 
exists then the insurer will be liable only for any loss which exceeds 
the limits of liability of said other specific, valid and collectible 
insurance;4 (2) pro rata-escape which provide that the insurer will be 
liable only for a pro rata share of the loss under certain conditions ani 
that the policy affords no coverage if other valid and collectible insurac 
2. Id. at 118, 341 P. 2d at 114: "If the Insured's liability under 
this policyis covered by any other valid and collectable insurance, the: 
this policy shall act as excess insurance over and above such other 
insurance. " 
3. See: New Amsterdam Gas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Ind~ 
Co., 18 F.Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Ky. 1937): 
-- If any other As sured included in this insurance is covered by valiG 
and collectable insurance against a claim also covered by this 
Policy, he shall not be entitled to protection under this Policy. 
4. See: Insurance Co. of Texas v. Employers Liab. Assur~ 
~, 163 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S. D. Cal. 1958): . 
If other valid insurance exists protecting the insured from l!a- . 
bility for such bodily injury • • • or destruction of property, t~; 
policy shall be null and void with respect to such specific haza:a 
otherwise cove red, whether the insured is specifically named in
1 
. h th t . f th applicab.t such other policy or not; provided, owever, a 1 e , 
limit of liability of this policy exceeds the applicable limit of succ 
other valid insurance, then this policy shall apply as excess 
1 ltcc ' insurance against such hazard in an amount equal to the app 
limit of liability of this policy minus the applicable limit of b 
bility of such other insurance. 
- 6- ., 
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is available under other conditions;5 and (3) pro rata-excess which 
provides that under certain conditions the insurer will be liable only 
for a pro rata share of the loss, while under other conditions, the 
insurer will be liable for any loss which exceeds the limits of liability 
of all other valid and collectible insurance. 6 
The principle case presents one of the most common 
situations where concurrent insurance coverage e:xists and there is a 
conflict between the "other insurance" clauses. Respondent's "other 
insurance" clause is one of the pure pro rata types which provides that 
the insurer will be liable only for a pro rata share of the loss. On the 
other hand, appellant's "other insurance" clause seems to be of the 
"primary-pro rata" variety which provides primary insurance unless 
other valid and collectible insurance applies to the loss on the same 
5. See: New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
~' 18 F. Supp. 707, 709 (W. D. Ky. 1937): 
If the named Assured carries any other Insurance covering concur-
!ently a claim covered by this Policy, he shall not recover'from the 
Company a larger proportion of any such claim than the sum hereby 
insured bears to the whole amount of valid and collectable concurrent 
insurance. If any other Assured included in this insurance is covered 
by valid and collectable insurance against a claim also covered by 
this Policy, he shall not be entitled to protection under this Policy. 
6. Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 
1386 (N. D. Ind. 1970) 
If there is other insurance ••• 
Allstate shall not be liable under this Part I [bodily injury and property 
damage} for a greater proportion of any loss than the applicable limit 
of liability stated on the Supplement Page bears to the total applicable 
linii.t oJ liability of all collectible insurance against such loss; pro-
i·irled, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute 
'·'·
1tornobile or a non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over 
''"\' other collectible insurance. 
-7-
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basis in which event the insurer will be liable only for a pro rata share 
of the loss. 
Initially, several theories were used to resolve the conflict-
ing "other insurance" clause problem. Out of property law concepts, 
courts developed the "prior-in-time" theory which assigned primary 
liability to the insurer whose policy first became effective. The case 
of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Company, 108 F. 2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940) and the case of Air Transp?rta-
tion Manufacturing Company v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporatioc, 
91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P. 2d 64 7 (1949) are representative of this view. 
It is doubtful that any jurisdiction follows this approach today, since 
courts were quick to realize that this particular inquiry was irrelevant 
where each policy was in effect at the time the liability arose. 
Under the "primary tort feasor" theory courts held the 
insurer primarily liable in whose policy the tort feasor was the named 
insured. See: Commercial Casualty Insurance Company v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Company, 190 Minn. 528, 252 N. W. 434 (1934); and 
American Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennsylvania Mutual 
Indemnity Company, 161 F. 2d 62 (3d Cir. 194 7). More often than not, 
this theory has been rejected on the grounds that liability policies are 
usually purchased with the intent of covering persons not specifically 
named, and because the negligent party frequently is not named in 
either policy. See: Oregon Automobile Insurance Company v. Un~ 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 195 F. 2d 958 (9th Cir. 196 2 ); J.iid 
-8-
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Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 444 S. W. 2d 583, 587 (Tex. 1969). 
Finally, what was commonly referred to as the "Pennsylvania 
rule" and more particularly as the "specific-general coverage" theory 
which determined the primary insurer on the basis of which policy pro-
vided more specific coverage of the insured's loss. This theory has 
also been rejected on numerous occasions. See: Oregon Automobile 
Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 
supra; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Insurance 
Company, 45 Cal. App. 2d 288, 114 P. 2d 34 (1941); Employers Liability 
Assurance Corporation v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 
188, 227 P. 2d 53 (1951); Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra; Union Insurance 
Company v. Iowa Hardware Mutual Insurance Company, 1 75 N. W. 2d 
413, 417 (Iowa 1970); and Continental Casualty Company v. Suttenfield, 
236 F. Zd 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1956). Nevertheless, a majority and 
mino'rity position have emerged with regard to the determination of 
the relative liability of two insurance companies providing concurrent 
coverage for the same loss. It is our position that the recent trend 
favoring the minority rule is indicative of the better view. But, in any 
event, appellant is entitled to recover under either theory. 
According to the majority view, . the relative liability of 
insuters is determined on a primary and secondary basis through a 
'·'"
0 f ·,1-'ction o1 the "other insurance" clauses. The basic premise of 
1 h 0 ··.iajority rule is that conflicting "other insurance" clauses are 
-9-
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amenable to the usual rules of interpretation of insurance contracts 
for detenni.ning the intention of the parties. The case most often 
cited in support of the majority view is Zurich General Accident & 
Liability Insurance Company v. Clamor, 124 F. 2d 717 (7th Cir, 1941. 
In short, the majority view rests ultimately on the language of the 
"other insurance" provision and reconciliation of any conflict which 
may exist is subject to the draftsmanship of the various insurance 
provisions. 
Under the minority view, courts have held that where 
concurrent insurance policies carry like "other insurance" clauses 
they are mutually repugnant and should be dis regarded. Apportion-
ment is to be prorated with regard both to damages and to the expense 
of defending the lawsuit. The leading representative of the minority 
view is Oregon Autemobile Insurance Company v. United States Fide_li_!: 
& Guaranty Company, 195 F. 2d 958 (9th Cir. 196 2). In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with conflicting excess and 
escape clauses on two automobile insurance policies. The insurer 
whose policy contained the escape clause appealed from a judgment 
assigning primary liability to it. The basis of the lower court decisioi 
was that the insurance policy containing the excess clause constituted 
"other insurance" to effectuate the escape clause. The Circuit Court 
reversed that decision and held that liability should be prorated arnonl 
the insurers thereby specifically rejecting the majority view as a 
means to reconcile concurrent liability. At one point, the court st''' 
-10-
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--
In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions 
of the two policies are indistinguishable in 
meaning and intent. One cannot rationally 
choose between them •••• Here, where 
both policies carry like "other insurance" 
provisions, we think they must be held mutually 
repugnant and hence be disregarded. Our con-
clusion is that such view affords the only 
rational solution of the dispute in this case. 
The proration is to be applied in respect both 
of damages and of the expense of defending the 
suits. (at 960) 
The minority position rejects the theory that "other 
insurance" clauses are reconcilable through interpretation. In the 
case of Union Insurance Company v. Iowa Hardward Mutual Insurance 
Company, supra, the court stated that attempting to reconcil conflict-
ing clauses, by attempting to assign primary and secondary liability 
on the basis of the language of the provisions, was "at best a pseudo-
solution in that it only aggravates a circular riddle. 11 
In another recent case involving conflicting "other insurance" 
provisions of two automobile insurance policies, the court in Allstate 
~surance Company v. American Underwriters, Inc., supra, rejected 
the majority view and adopted the minority position stating: 
Cases of this type cannot be resolved either 
by a literal reading of the language used or by 
an inquiry into intent. 
And the only way to effectuate the intent of 
both companies would be by holding neither 
liable--a result which would obviously be 
contrary to public policy. Under the circum-
stances, the only fair solution, and the one 
-11-
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which this court believes would be adopted 
by the Indiana courts, is to find the excess 
clause and the escape clause mutually 
repugnant, and to require the two insurers 
to share the loss in proportion to the limits 
of their respective policies. (at 1388) 
Two recent Law Review articles have outlined the advan-
tages of the minority view. See: 20 Hastings Law Journal, 1292, 1304 
(1969) Conflicts Between "Other Insurance" Clauses in Automobile 
Liability Insurance Policies; and 1971 Indiana Law Journal, 270-2,85, 
Resolution of Conflicting "Other Insurance" Clauses: New Developments 
in Indiana. At various times, the following have been cited as advantages 
of the minority position: (1) It avoids circular reasoning, depending as 
it were, on which policy one happens to read first; (2) it avoids the 
difficulty of searching for the intent of insurers through a construction 
of the clauses when they are but "fortuitous adversaries" with no privity 
of contract existing between them; (3) it recognizes the self-evident 
fact that the intentions of both the insurers are, in fact, to reduce or 
eliminate liability in this instance; (4) arguably, under the majority 
view, the rights of the insured become badly obscured, if not defeated, 
by the contractual contest engaged in by casualty insurers; (5) the 
majority view encourages the continuing battle of draftsmanship of 
still more specific policy terms; (6) the minority view does not arbi-
trarily pick one of the conflicting clauses and give effect to it; (7) it 
does not deprive the insured of any coverage; (8) it is not prejudicial 
in giving a windfall to one insurer at the expense of another; (9) it rlu, 
1? 
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not encourage litigation between insurers; (10) it does not delay settle-
ments; (11) it does enable underwriters to predict the losses of the 
insure rs mo re accurately; (12) it does preclude the use of illogical 
rules developed by the various courts (e.g., first in time, specific v. 
general and primary tort feasor doctrines); (13) and it does give a 
basis for uniformity of result; (14) in addition, prorating the loss 
among all insurers is a rule that can be applied regardless of the 
number of insurers involved and regardless of the type of conflicts 
that are created by the "other insurance" clauses; and (15) finally, 
the rule is simplier, more convenient and easier to apply than the 
majority rule. The philosophy underlying the minority rule is best 
articulated in the case of Fireman's Insurance Company v. St. Paul 
Fire &: Marine Insurance Company, 243 Ore. 10, 411 P. 2d 271, 274 
(1966) wherein it states: 
This court believes it is good public policy 
not to put an insured plaintiff, or a defendant 
who is fortunate enough to have duplicate 
coverage, in a position where there is any 
possibility one insurer can say, "After you, 
my dear Alphonse!" while the other says, 
"Oh, no, after you, my dear Gaston. 11 They 
must walk arm in arm through the door of 
responsibility. 
In Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah2d 157, 417 P. 2d 658 (1966) 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority rule, as described, with 
regard to the construction of "other insurance" provisions of uninsured 
motorist automobile coverage. That case involved conflicting "excess" 
"nd 'r>ro rata" clauses. Specifically, the court stated: 
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ing: 
Where there is a conflict between a pro 
rata and an excess "other insurance" clause, 
a majority of the courts have imposed pri-
mary liability on the pro rata insurer and 
hold the excess insurer responsible only for 
secondary coverage of the loss, 
* * * * 
Plaintiff urges this court to adopt a minority 
view that the "other insurance" provisions 
are mutually repugnant because there is no 
rational basis to find United has primary 
liability and therefore each company should 
pay a pro rata share of the judgment up to 
the limits of the policies. This is evidently 
the view adopted by the lower court. 
* * * * 
• [W]e are constrained to adopt the 
majority rule which imposes primary lia-
bility on the pro rata insurer and secondary 
liability on the excess insurer. (at 660-661) 
Justice Crockett in a concurring opinion noted the follow-
It is my opinion that if there is in fact mul-
tiple coverage, it would generally be fair and 
equitable to require the insurance companies 
to share the loss as provided in the pro rata 
clauses •••• The fundamental questions to 
be determined are whether the claimant is 
cove red, and whether the re is in fact multiple 
coverage. If there is, I would reject tortuous 
and specious rationalizations on the basis of 
priority in time, more specificness as to 
vehicle or individual, or as to primary tort-
feasor, and make an equitable apportionment 
of the loss. (at 663) 
A year later in the case of Prudential Federal Sa~'-
Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, 20 Utah Zd q; 
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.. 
P. Zd 602 (1967), this court apparently adopted the archaic, and 
generally dis regarded, rule commonly known as the "Specific-
General Coverage" theory which determines the primary insurer on 
the basis of which policy provided more specific coverage of the 
insured 1 s loss. The court described the fact situation as follows: 
• • • One Rowley was a loan officer for 
Prudential. Hw owned and sold to Parker 
in 1962 realty on a contract. He (Rowley) 
had given First Federal a first mortgage 
on this realty of some $14, 000. In December 
of 1962 Parker applied to Prudential for a 
mortgage loan of $16, 300, to be secured by 
a first lien on this realty purchased from 
Rowley, Prudential obtained from Security 
Title a Preliminary Title Report showing 
the mortgage to First Federal and advising 
Prudential a title policy for $16,300 would 
be issued on vesting of Prudential's interest. 
Prudential later loaned Parker $16, 300, and 
Rowley took $14, 600 to liquidate his contract 
with Parker and the balance was paid to 
Prudential to cover loan cos ts. Prudential's 
Trust Deed was dated December 26, 1962. 
The first mortgage to First Federal was 
not discharged, hence it retained its first 
lien. In 1965, Prudential discovered Rowley 
had embezzled sizeable sums over past years 
and learned for the first time that First 
Federal held a first mortgage on the Parker 
property. This, doubtless, prompted the 
instant case. (at 602-603) 
Basically, Prudential contended that Rowley's pecula-
tions were the sole and proximate cause of their loss of the first lien 
on the Parker property. On the other hand, St. Paul argued that 
the tit!: insurance was primary liable, because Prudential's claim 
lin11tc:d to the lack of a first lien, and it was this deprivation that 
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constituted the primary responsibility of the title insurance policy. 
This court concurred with the latter and ruled in pertinent part that: 
The rule having wide applicability pro-
vides that where a blanket policy contains 
a provision limiting its liability to an 
excess over specific insurance, the 
blanket policy must respond, only if the 
specific fails to satisfy the loss. (at 603) 
Applying the same rule, Justice Tuckett in his dissenting 
opinion would have ruled that the St. Paul policy was primary. He 
states: 
It appears to me that the loss we are here 
concerned with stenrmed directly from 
Rowley's peculation and that this specific 
risk was covered by St. Paul's policy. St. 
Paul, having insured the specific risk, 
became obligated to pay plaintiff's loss to 
the extent of its policy and the title insurance 
policy should be treated a general insurance 
covering only a general risk of loss to the 
plaintiff by reason of a title defect that can 
only be resorted to in the event that the 
specific coverage is exhausted. (at 604) 
Chief Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion noted the 
inherent difficulties with the rule adopted by the majority and stated 
his objections as follows: 
• • • This, for me, emphasizes the 
desirability of the practical solution which 
I suggest would be fair and equitable: that 
where two insurance policies would each 
cover the same loss, that is, where either 
of them would have to pay the loss if the other 
did not exist, they should each pay their 
equitable share of the loss. 
-16- tr 
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•• And there are other problems encountered 
in attempting to determine which of two in-
surers covering the same loss should be held 
liable. One is that a specific coverage is 
usually held accountable ahead of a general 
coverage. The argument proceeds thus: that 
since it was the first mortgage protection that 
was lost, this was specifically covered by 
title insurance policy, and that company should 
pay. Opposed to this is the argument that the 
foundational cause of the loss was the embezzle-
ment by Rowley, which is specifically covered 
by St. Paul, wherefore, the latter should pay. 
And so we are led through circuitous rationali-
zations in an effort to fix liability on one insurer 
and to exclude the other, and are urged to see 
the answer to this problem as either black or 
white, in an area which, to me, is grey. 
For the reasons above stated, in my opinion 
it would be more fair and realistic to rule 
that where there are two or more insurance 
coverages, each of which would be liable for 
a loss except for the existence of coverage by 
the other, each should bear its fair share of 
the loss. This would normally mean that if 
the loss is within their policy limits, they 
should share equally in paying it. (at 
605) 
In the case of National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Company v. Farmers Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 
P, 2d 786 (1963) and in the case of Christensen v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 21 Utah Zd 194, 443 P. 2d 385 (1968), this court also dealt 
summarily with this issue, not discussing it in length, holding that, 
iii the context of automobile insurance, the insurance of the owner of 
•:p ,ll,li,u,nol)lle is presumed to be primary and the insurance of the non-
'.':lier driver of the automobile is presumed to be secondary where 
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there is concurrent coverage and a conflict between the two policies, 
Because we are dealing with a different variety of insurance policies 
(comprehensive automobile liability policy and homeowners policy) 
and different fact situations, neither of the two above-mentioned 
owner-driver automobile cases nor presumptions stated therein are 
particularly helpful. 
Applying the minority rule to the facts of this case, the 
pro rata "other insurance" clause of Brent G. Story's homeowners 
policy with respondent and the primary-pro rata "other insurance" 
clause of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse's comprehensive 
automobile liability policy with appellant are mutually repugnant and 
should be disregarded, and the court should order an equitable 
apportionment of the loss on a pro rata basis. That appears to be 
the only equitable result where there is multiple coverage and each 
would be responsible for the loss but for the e:xistence of coverage by 
the other, 
Applying the majority rule to the facts of this case, 
apportionment of the loss should still be made on a pro rata basis. 
The "other insurance" clause of Brent G. Story's homeowners policy 
with respondent provides that respondent shall not be liable for a 
greater proportion of any loss than the amount thereby insured shall 
bear to the whole insurance covering the property against the peril 
involved, whether collectible or not. Essentially, it is a pure pro 
rata provision as compared to an escape, excess, escape-excess, pro 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rata-escape, pro rata-excess, etc., type provision. In other words, 
it is the intent of the policy to provide primary insurance with a pro 
rata qualification if there is other insurance covering the peril, 
whether collectible or not. 
Looking to the language of the "other insurance" provision 
of Weber County Sheriff's Mounted Posse's insurance policy with 
appellant, it states in substance that: (1) The insurance policy pro-
vides primary insurance; (2) when the insurance is primary and the 
insured has other insurance which is stated to be applicable to the loss 
on an excess or contingent basis, the amount of the company's liability 
under said policy shall not be reduced by the existence of such other 
insurance; and (3) when this insurance and other insurance apply to the 
loss on the same basis the company shall not be liable for a greater 
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability of all valid 
and collectible insurance against such loss. The intent being that the 
insurance be primary, but if there is other applicable insurance which 
appli'es on the same basis and doesn't apply on a contingency or excess 
basis, then the loss should be sustained proportionately. 
Returning again to the language of respondent's "other 
insurance" clause, it does not state that it applies to the loss on an 
excess or contingent basis. It does not state that it provides excess 
insurance only should there be concurrent coverage by a specific policy. 
The p-resumption should be, based upon the silence of the draftsman where 
: .• , !~_,rl thee opportunity to speak, that the insurance is primary. Because 
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after looking at the language of the insurance contracts, interpreting 
and construing said contracts, multiple coverage exists on the same 
basis, the court should honor the contracts as written and apportion 
the loss on a pro rata basis. Within the context of the majority rule, 
we are wont to agree with the court in Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association v. St. Paul Insurance Companies, at 603, where it 
states: 
The rule having wide applicability pro-
vides that where a blanket policy contains 
a provision limiting its liability to an 
excess over specific insurance, the blanket 
policy must respond, only if the specific 
fails to satisfy the loss. • • • 
In this case, respondent's homeowners insurance policy 
does not contain a provision limiting its liability to an excess over 
specific insurance. 
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that based upon both 
the majority and minority rule, appellant is entitled to recover from 
respondent its proportionate share of the loss sustained. 
POINT II 
A SPECIFIC INSURANCE POLICY IS NOT PRIMARY 
INSURANCE AND A GENERAL INSURANCE POLICY 
IS NOT EXCESS INSURANCE BY MERE REASON OF 
FACT THAT LOSS COMES WITffiN COVERAGE OF 
BOTH POLICIES, ONE BEING DESIGNED 
SPECIFICALLY FOR LOSS SUSTAINED AND THE 
OTHER BEING A GENERAL POLICY WffiCH 
INCLUDES PARTICULAR LOSS WITIDN ITS SCOPE 
Although initially courts dealing with the problem oi 
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-concurrent insurance coverage used the "specific-general coverage" 
theory to determine the primary insurer on the basis of which policy 
provided more specific coverage of the insured's loss, today that 
theory is generally disregarded. With respect thereto, the traditional 
rule is stated in Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 62:42, Proration 
between general and specific policies: 
The fact that a loss comes within the cover-
age of two policies, one being designed 
specifically for the loss sustained and the 
other being a general policy which includes 
the particular loss within its scope, does 
not make the specific policy primary insurance 
and the general policy excess insurance. 
(at 497) 
In the case of American Employers 1 Insurance Company 
v. Continental Casualty Company, 85 N.M. 346, 512 P. 2d 674 (1973) 
a suit was brought by a comprehensive liability insurer for declara-
tion of its non-liability in respect to defense of insured and counterclaim 
by professional liability insurer for indemnification and reimburse-
ment for expenditures made by it in defending and settling the suits 
against the insured. In that case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
held that a specific policy is not primary insurance and a general 
policy is not excess insurance by mere reason of fact that loss comes 
within the coverage of both policies, the one being designed specifically 
ioi' lhe loss sustained and the other being a blanket policy which in-
'li~-:l, -- the 1v:i rticular loss. 
As has been previously noted, neither the majority rule, 
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which looks to the language of the policy to determine the intent of 
the parties, nor the minority rule, which holds conflicting clauses 
mutually repugnant and prorates the applicable insurance, maintain 
that a specific policy is primary insurance and a general policy excess 
insurance where the loss comes within the coverage of both policies, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant seeks to have the 
Order granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment set aside, and 
further seeks a judgment in its favor and against the respondent. 
r p:cttly oubmitted, 
) I/~; cf~ It G1 y RISTIAN 
@=R. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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